An Examination into Alternative Leadership in the Great October Socialist Revolution

Written with references to  The Mexican Revolution: A short history, 1910-1920 by Easterling, Revolutionary russia, 1891-1991: A history by Figes, and Zinoviev and Kamenev by Trotsky

Revolution, though in many cases inevitable, is a long and arduous process dependent on fortuitious and advantageous moments. In the case of the Russian Revolution, we see a very typical progression towards revolutionary action. With urbanization and the development of a modern market-based economy, shifts in profession amongst peasants, merchants, and noblemen, the number of university students increasing by nearly 14 times between 1860 and 1914, and an exponential increase in the number of public opinion outlets, the conditions were ripe for dramatic social change. With the growth of nationalist movements for peasants’ land and native language rights, significant rises in literacy rates, and growth of information dispersal, we see a nearly formulaic progression towards revolution. But revolution need not necessarily be violent or armed. How can we perceive a more peaceful resolution of the events of the Russian Revolution, more specifically those surrounding the Great October Socialist Revolution, and what would such a counter-factual history necessitate? To answer these questions, we must first understand the conditions which preceded, and essentially allowed for, the Bolshevik seizure of power. We must then identify the key determinants and characters which pushed history in the direction of revolution in order to understand what a plausible counter-factual history may include. 

The Great October Socialist Revolution, contrary to its heavily-sensationalized image in popular culture and media, was a small-scale effort. Only a small, armed, and disciplined force was needed for the coup d’etat. Despite the successful execution of the uprising, there is sufficient reason to believe that an alternative (an unarmed resolution to the Bolshevik acquisition of power) was quite plausible. For instance, Bolshevik rule remained precarious after the October Revolution and there was much doubt surrounding the longevity of their power. There was little genuine support for the Bolsheviks across the board, and that which did come from the middle class and peasants was more of support for their performative policies in expropriating and humiliating the bourgeoisie and upper class through seizures, threats, and taxes. Additionally, although redistributive policies were instituted by the Bolsheviks, peasants were still largely distanced from the Petrograd and were conducting land redistribution effectively themselves. Figes describes the perception peasants held of the parliament as “...dominated by urban parties and associated with the discredited Duma (Figes, P. 101).” It is important to note here that prior to the revolution, the people generally favored a Socialist coalition government and the Socialist parties sustained a combined majority vote share of 78% following the elections of 1917 (see Fig. 1). Without the large-scale support for a revolution or integrated connections with the populace, we are left with the following questions: what was the most significant factor responsible for the success of the October Revolution and how can we perceive events to have gone differently without the need for an armed revolution?

The initial sentiments and events which would eventually snowball into the October Revolution find root in the Kornilov Affair. In brief, the Kornilov Affair began as a conflict between Prime Minister Kerensky and his appointed Commander-in-Chief, Kornilov. The two held different ideologies in regards to many issues, such as death penalty for citizens, militarization of railways and defence industries, and bans on workers’ organizations. Kerensky eventually turned against Kornilov, who had been expecting the rise of a military dictatorship, condemning him as a counter-revolutionary and a traitor, dismissing him from his position. The Bolsheviks would later leverage this belief of a ‘counter-revolutionary threat’ as a component of their ideological platform in seeking power. The Kornilov Affair benefited the Bolsheviks the most for several reasons. Kerensky’s political position in the Kornilov Affair left him cornered and hated by both the left and right, the former for being suspected of associating with Kornilov’s counter-revolutionary action and the latter for condemning Kornilov. The Kornilov Affair reinforced the belief in the existence of a counter-revolutionary threat against the Soviet. The Bolsheviks would later proceed to invoke this belief to mobilize the Red Guards and militants in October. Amidst this crisis, the Bolsheviks emerged as the only political party which stood as “All power to the Soviets” and won their first majority in the Petrograd Soviet. Thus we have the stage set for a shift in power. The true seizure of power by the Bolsheviks occured, however, in the procession of the Second All-Russian Soviet Congress. We may attribute the success of the October Revolution not only to the power vacuum that needed to be filled, but to the nature of the man that filled it --Vladimir Lenin. 

Before exploring a counter-factual history of peaceful resolution, we must first examine the character of Lenin and his motivations as key factors in the timeline of the revolution. Lenin’s hunger for power and tunnel vision for revolution drove the uprising to success in the face of opposition amongst his contemporaries in Bolshevik leadership. He urged the Central Committee to proceed with an armed uprising once the SR’s and Mensheviks renewed their coalition and failed to break with the Kadets at the Democratic Conference. Lenin’s impatience was partially rooted in his belief that “Bolsheviks can and must take state power into their own hands.”--must, because he believed that the convocation of the Constituent Assembly would give Kerensky and his allies the opportunity to take pre-emptive action such as giving up the Petrograd to the Germans or establishing a military dictatorship; can, because the Party had the capacity as they had won the majority in Moscow. 

But his motivation was also political. If the Constituent Assembly proceeded as planned, Lev Kamenev, Lenin’s arch rival within the party, would have emerged as the central figure, regardless of the coalition government that formed. A Soviet coalition also implied power-sharing amongst the Socialist parties, whereas seizure would force the other Socialist parties to either endorse Bolshevik action or leave the Bolsheviks in power. Lenin’s views, however, were largely isolated. As noted by Figes, most people supported a Socialist coalition government and most Bolshevik leaders were opposed to any action before the Soviet Congress: “It is one of the ironies of the Bolshevik insurrection that hardly any of its leaders had wanted it to happen how and when it did (Figes, P. 95).” Yet, at the secret Central Committee meeting prior to the uprising, Lenin was able to sway Bolshevik leadership in his favor, with only the opposition and resignation of Kamenev and Zinoviev. 

We can attribute Lenin’s powers of persuasion in the face of opposition to the source of his authority: charisma. If we look towards Max Weber’s sociological framework for types of authority, Lenin falls into the category of the charismatic leader. He lacked the historical precedence needed for a traditional leader and his authority was not legitimized by any doctrine or institution, as in the case of rational-legal leaders. Instead, individuals were influenced by his curated image of personal qualities, more specifically his persistence and conviction to his vision. Prior to the Second All-Russian Soviet Congress, Lenin had been continually writing to Bolshevik leadership from Finland, urging action. Additionally, charismatic leaders usually emerge in times of crisis and offer innovative, and often radical solutions. Lenin was no different in his proposal for an armed uprising in the midst of the Second Soviet Congress. 

We must also note here that his success as a charismatic leader comes in conjunction with the circumstances of his context. For example, Pancho Villa of the Mexican Revolution also drew his authority from his charisma but did not encounter the same fortune as Lenin. Although the key component of Villa’s supportership was his image, he faced different circumstances in his political aspirations. His goal was to amass forces to create the largest army possible, heedless of the need to rally them around a common idea. This would contribute to his downfall as it led to fragmentation within his forces. His allies, the Zapatistas, grew distant from the cause and failed to disrupt Obregón’s supply lines in the crucial city of Puebla, the gateway to Mexico City. By the time he began to attempt to appease the fragmentation, it was too late: “Zapata’s public declarations became more and more radical, in part under the influence of the left-wing intellectuals in his camp: he now spoke of the goal of socialism in Morelos. Later he even began to issue appeals to the urban working class, but it was in many respects too late (Easterling, P.120).”

Lenin’s authority, despite being of the same source, was targeted to a much more ideologically homogeneous demographic and was focused on communicating a common and unifying goal. Additionally, we may consider that Lenin was successful because he did not face a direct challenge to his power. Although Kamenev was presumed to be the leader who would emerge from a Socialist coalition, he did not challenge Lenin’s authority in the secret meeting, instead simply disagreeing and choosing to resign. 

In a counter-factual history, however, a challenge to Lenin’s authority could have potentially resulted in a turn of events with a more peaceful resolution, especially if said challenge came from an individual of whom leadership was already expected --Kamenev. Prior to the uprising, Kamenev stood in opposition to Lenin in that he did not believe that the time was ripe for an uprising. But we must also take into account that Kamenev was not committed to an uprising, especially an armed one, as he was responsible for spearheading the Socialist coalition. But we are still left with the question of why Kamenev conceded to Lenin on the night of the secret meeting. 

We may find the answer in a translated journal kept by Trotsky as he recounts the nature of Kamenev and his relationship with politics. Trotsky describes Kamenev as a “propagandist” who “erred on the side of excessive caution”, “given to reasoning and analyzing”, and a “sybarite” and “asthete”. By all means in this account, Kamenev was perceived as rather passive in politics, yet held a central position in the situation. Thus Kamenev challenging Lenin, a charismatic authority with conviction in his cause, seems rather implausible. However, Kamenev was not the only Bolshevik leader who resigned that night and exposed Lenin. Though he did not share the same central position in the pending Socialist coalition, Grigory Zinoviev also chose to walk out with Kamenev. But Zinoviev’s personality was nearly polar opposite to that of Kamenev. Also from Trotsky’s account, Zinoviev is described as “an agitator”, “guided in the main by subtle political instinct”, “inclined to fly off at a tangent”, and “entirely absorbed by politics, cultivating no other interests and appetites.” But Zinoviev also chose not to challenge Lenin, instead walking out with Kamenev. It is unlikely that either of these figures was capable of individually directly challenging Lenin at that meeting. However, their complementary natures, skills, interests, and positions may have presented sufficient capacity to oppose Lenin adequately and execute the formation of a Socialist coalition. This joint effort seems more likely as there actually existed comradery between the two men. Trotsky recounts this as well in his journal: “They were subsequently drawn together by their opposition to me, and later, to Stalin. Throughout the last thirteen years of their lives, they marched side by side, and their names were always mentioned together.” 

If Kamenev and Zinoviev had combined forces to fill the gap of leadership, their ideal strategy moving forward would have been ensuring that Lenin did not succeed in swaying Bolshevik leaders at the secret Central Committee meeting. One of Lenin’s key arguments in favor of an armed uprising, as noted earlier, was that time of the essence. He argued that waiting for the Constituent Assembly would have given Kerensky the opportunity to potentially give the Petrograd to the Germans or establish a military dictatorship. In the case of Kamenev in the center of the formation of the Socialist coalition, Lenin very well could have been right in this concern. Zinoviev, however, was much more aggressive and involved in his interactions and interests. He could have supplemented Kamenev’s analytical nature in adding the fuel to prompt the coalition forward in a more timely manner. Thus Kamenev and Zinoviev would have needed to reassure the Bolshevik leaders that night that the coalition would be formed before Keresnky had the opportunity to ally with the Germans or establish a military dictatioship. This would have been a sufficient reassurance considering that, aside from Lenin, no one was particularly inclined towards an armed uprising anyway. 

Prior to the secret meeting, however, Kamenev and Zinoviev would have needed to ensure that the SR’s and Mensheviks did not renew their coalition with the Kadets, as that had been the event that triggered Lenin’s impatience and provided the basis for his advocacy. The key to a successful coalition would have been consolidation of power: emphasizing the intersection of interests and commonalities of the groups, instead of catering to each segment of the fragmentation. We can see the failure of the latter demonstrated in the actions of Carranza in the Mexican Revolution. Upon becoming prime minister after the overthrow of Porforio Diaz, Carranza was confronted with the challenge of maintaining a delicate balance between appeasing the military, namely Constitutionalist generals who were uninterested in land reform, efforts to carry out the pro-landlord agenda, and the land reform advocated by the Jacobin officers. Carranza attempted to sustain balance through adding overtures to the Constitution in 1917 to address land reform, though it was mostly lip service. He then proceeded to break his alliance with the trade unions and continued Madero’s campaign against Morelos His downfall came following his counterrevolutionary actions repressing the Zapatista movement. He faced backlash from Pancho Villa, the Jacobins, Zapatistas, trade unions, and moderate factions as they all rallied behind Obregón. 

Kamenev and Zinoviev would have faced a Petrograd far less ideologically fragmented than the groups involved in Carranza’s case, making their chances of succeeding with a Socialist coalition government much more likely. They would have needed to curate an image of ideological cohesiveness between the various Socialist groups. Appeasing the SR’s would not have presented much expense to the Bolsheviks or the Mensheviks as returning land to the peasants, the major aim of the SR’s, would have been conducted under Bolshevik rule regardless. The Mensheviks could have also easily aligned with Kamenev and Zinoviev as they mainly differed from Lenin and many Bolsheviks in their preference for a more democratic and procedural approach to power, as opposed to revolution. In this sequence of events, the October Revolution would not have necessarily occurred as the Socialist coalition government would have been formed before Lenin could persuade Bolshevik leaders otherwise. 

The most obvious counter-argument would simply be: and what about Lenin? It is difficult to predict if Lenin would have been as insistent on the uprising if the SR’s and Mensheviks had not renewed the coalition with the Kadets. However, as noted earlier, Lenin’s success in the execution of the October Revolution can be attributed to his conviction to his vision, but also his hunger for power. We may speculate that his actions were also partially driven by the expectation that Kamenev, a rather passive individual by personality, would emerge as the head of government. In this counter-factual history, although the need for revolution is resolved and a new Socialist coalition is formed without the need for an armed uprising, Lenin’s need for power remains unsatiated. In one potential scenario, he may have pursued his own goals in seizing the government even without the approval of Bolshevik leaders. He could have mobilized loyalists to his personal cause and still been successful as only a small force was needed to conduct the uprising. In this situation, it would have been best for Kamenev and Zinoviev to anticipate Lenin to go rogue and prepare to leverage their strength in numbers and stand their ground. As noted by Figes, one of the fatal determinants of the October Revolution was when the SR’s and Mensheviks walked out of the assembly, essentially handing the Petrograd over to Lenin. Simply remaining in the room and opposing Lenin would have challenged the outcome of history of the October Revolution as we know it.

The Socialists did not need to be so authoritarian if Lenin had not been so hell-bent on securing power. An armed uprising was not necessary in the sequence of events in history as the formation of Socialist coalition government was in process and generally favored by both the populace and Bolshevik leadership. However, the effort lacked strategic and driven leadership, sharply contrasting Lenin’s persistent personality and conviction to his vision. Without Lenin’s personal efforts and charismatic authority, the armed uprising would have been wholly arbitrary. However, his presence as an essential character is inevitable. In order to redirect the events of history, we would have needed to observe an adequate challenge to Lenin’s power. As per Trotsky’s personal accounts of the personalities in Bolshevik leadership, Kamenev and Zinoviev, who had both voted against Lenin at the secret Central Committee, could not have successfully challenged Lenin. Their combined supplementary personalities, skills, and positions in the situation would have been necessary to sufficiently bring about a Socialist coalition government. With Zinoviev’s more aggressive personality, Kamenev could have potentially prevented the SR’s and Mensheviks from renewing the coalition with the Kadets, pre-emptively stunting Lenin on his path to power.